TrueCrypt – Wikipedia

Discontinued source-available disk encoding utility

TrueCrypt is a break source-available freeware utility program used for on-the-fly encoding ( OTFE ). It can create a virtual code harrow within a file, or encrypt a division or the whole storage device ( pre-boot authentication ). On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt web site announced that the project was nobelium long maintained and recommended users find alternate solutions. Though development of TrueCrypt has ceased, an independent audit of TrueCrypt ( published in March 2015 ) has concluded that no meaning flaws are award. [ 5 ] Two projects forked from TrueCrypt : VeraCrypt ( active agent ) and CipherShed [ 6 ] ( abandoned ).

history [edit ]

TrueCrypt was initially released as interpretation 1.0 in February 2004, based on E4M ( Encryption for the Masses ). respective versions and many extra minor releases have been made since then, with the most current adaptation being 7.1a. [ 1 ]

E4M and SecurStar dispute [edit ]

original dismissal of TrueCrypt was made by anonymous developers called “ the TrueCrypt Team ”. [ 7 ] shortly after version 1.0 was released in 2004, the TrueCrypt Team reported receiving e-mail from Wilfried Hafner, coach of SecurStar, a calculator security caller. [ 8 ] According to the TrueCrypt Team, Hafner claimed in the electronic mail that the acknowledge generator of E4M, developer Paul Le Roux, had stolen the reservoir code from SecurStar as an employee. [ 8 ] It was further stated that Le Roux illegally distributed E4M, and authored an illegal license permitting anyone to base derivative work on the code and distribute it freely. Hafner alleges all versions of E4M constantly belonged only to SecurStar, and Le Roux did not have any right to release it under such a license. [ 8 ] This led the TrueCrypt Team to immediately stop develop and circulate TrueCrypt, which they announced on-line through usenet. [ 8 ] TrueCrypt Team member David Tesařík stated that Le Roux informed the team that there was a legal challenge between himself and SecurStar, and that he received legal deliberation not to comment on any issues of the case. Tesařík concluded that should the TrueCrypt Team continue distributing TrueCrypt, Le Roux may ultimately be held apt and be forced to pay attendant damages to SecurStar. To continue in good faith, he said, the team would need to verify the robustness of the E4M license. however, because of Le Roux ‘s need to remain silent on the count, he was unable to confirm or deny its authenticity, keeping TrueCrypt exploitation in limbo. [ 8 ] [ 9 ] thereafter, manque visitors reported trouble accessing the TrueCrypt web site, and third-party mirrors appeared on-line making the informant code and installer continually available, outside of official sanction by the TrueCrypt Team. [ 10 ] [ 11 ] In the FAQ section of its web site, SecurStar maintains its claims of ownership over both E4M and Scramdisk, another free encoding program. The company states that with those products, SecurStar “ had a long tradition of open source software ”, but that “ competitors had nothing better to do but to steal our reference code ”, causing the caller to make its products closed-source, forcing likely customers to place a significant order and sign a non-disclosure agreement before being allowed to review the code for security. [ 12 ] Le Roux himself has denied developing TrueCrypt in a court hear in March 2016, in which he besides confirmed he had written E4M. [ 13 ]

version 2.0 [edit ]

Months late on 7 June 2004, TrueCrypt 2.0 was released. [ 1 ] The new version contained a different digital key signature from that of the original TrueCrypt Team, with the developers now being referred to as “ the TrueCrypt Foundation. ” The software license was besides changed to the open beginning GNU General Public License ( GPL ). however, given the wide image of components with differing licenses making up the software, and the contest nature of the legality of the broadcast ‘s free, a few weeks former on 21 June, version 2.1 was released under the master E4M license to avoid electric potential problems relating to the GPL license. [ 1 ] [ 14 ] Version 2.1a of the software was released on 1 October 2004 on sub-domain. [ 1 ] By May 2005, the original TrueCrypt web site returned and redirected visitors to .

end of life announcement [edit ]

On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt official web site,, began redirecting visitors to with a HTTP 301 “ Moved permanently ” status, which warned that the software may contain nebulous security issues, and that development of TrueCrypt was ended in May 2014, following Windows XP ‘s end of corroborate. The message noted that more holocene versions of Windows have built-in support for magnetic disk encoding using BitLocker, and that Linux and OS X had like built-in solutions, which the message states renders TrueCrypt unnecessary. The page recommends any data encrypted by TrueCrypt be migrated to other encoding setups and offered instructions on moving to BitLocker. The SourceForge undertaking page for the software at was updated to display the lapp initial message, and the status was changed to “ inactive. ” [ 15 ] The foliate besides announced a new software version, 7.2, which merely allows decoding. initially, the authenticity of the announcement and newly software was questioned. [ 16 ] [ 17 ] [ 18 ] Multiple theories attempting to explain the cause behind the announcement arose throughout the technical school community. [ 19 ] [ 3 ] shortly after the end of liveliness announcement of TrueCrypt, Gibson Research Corporation posted an announcement titled “ Yes … TrueCrypt is silent safe to use ” and a Final Release Repository to host the last official non-crippled translation 7.1a of TrueCrypt. [ 3 ] They nobelium long do as of 2022. has been excluded from the Internet Archive Wayback Machine. [ 20 ] Their exception policy says they exclude pages at web site owner request. [ 21 ]

Operating systems [edit ]

TrueCrypt supports Windows, OS X and Linux operating systems. [ 22 ] Both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of these operating systems are supported, except for Windows IA-64 ( not supported ) and Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard ( runs as a 32-bit process ). [ 22 ] The translation for Windows 7, Windows Vista, and Windows XP can encrypt the boot partition or stallion boot drive. [ 23 ]

freelancer implementations [edit ]

There is an freelancer, compatible [ 24 ] [ 25 ] implementation, tcplay, for DragonFly BSD [ 24 ] and Linux. [ 25 ] [ 26 ] The Dm-crypt faculty included in default Linux kernel supports a TrueCrypt target called “ tcw ” since Linux version 3.13. [ 27 ] [ 28 ] [ 29 ]

encoding dodge [edit ]

algorithm [edit ]

individual ciphers supported by TrueCrypt are AES, Serpent, and Twofish. additionally, five different combinations of cascade algorithm are available : AES-Twofish, AES-Twofish-Serpent, Serpent-AES, Serpent-Twofish-AES and Twofish-Serpent. [ 30 ] The cryptanalytic hashish functions available for manipulation in TrueCrypt are RIPEMD-160, SHA-512, and Whirlpool. [ 31 ]

Modes of operation [edit ]

TrueCrypt presently uses the XTS mode of operation. [ 32 ] Prior to this, TrueCrypt used LRW modality in versions 4.1 through 4.3a, and CBC manner in versions 4.0 and earlier. [ 1 ] XTS manner is thought to be more secure than LRW mode, which in call on is more fasten than CBC mood. [ 33 ] Although new volumes can only be created in XTS mode, TrueCrypt is back compatible with older volumes using LRW modality and CBC modality. [ 1 ] Later versions produce a security warn when mounting CBC manner volumes and recommend that they be replaced with newly volumes in XTS mode .

Keys [edit ]

The heading key and the secondary header winder ( XTS modality ) are generated using PBKDF2 with a 512- bit strategic arms limitation talks and 1000 or 2000 iterations, depending on the underlying hash function used. [ 34 ]

plausible deniability [edit ]

TrueCrypt supports a concept called plausible deniability, [ 35 ] by allowing a individual “ hidden volume ” to be created within another volume. [ 36 ] In addition, the Windows versions of TrueCrypt have the ability to create and run a obscure encrypted operate on system whose being may be denied. [ 37 ] The TrueCrypt documentation lists many ways in which TrueCrypt ‘s obscure book deniability features may be compromised ( e.g. by third-party software which may leak data through irregular files, thumbnails, and so forth, to unencrypted disks ) and possible ways to avoid this. [ 38 ] In a paper published in 2008 and focused on the then latest version ( v5.1a ) and its plausible deniability, a team of security researchers led by Bruce Schneier states that Windows Vista, Microsoft Word, Google Desktop, and others store information on unencrypted disks, which might compromise TrueCrypt ‘s plausible deniability. The study suggested the addition of a hidden operate system functionality ; this sport was added in TrueCrypt 6.0. When a obscure function organization is running, TrueCrypt besides makes local unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes read-only to prevent data leaks. [ 37 ] The security of TrueCrypt ‘s execution of this feature was not evaluated because the first version of TrueCrypt with this option had only recently been released. [ 39 ] There was a functional evaluation of the deniability of shroud volumes in an earlier version of TrueCrypt by Schneier et aluminum. that found security leaks. [ 40 ]

Identifying TrueCrypt volumes [edit ]

When analyzed, TrueCrypt volume appear to have no header and contain random data. [ 41 ] TrueCrypt volumes have sizes that are multiples of 512 due to the block size of the cipher mood [ 32 ] and key data is either 512 bytes stored individually in the case of system encoding or two 128 kilobit headers for non-system containers. [ 42 ] Forensics tools may use these properties of file size, apparent miss of a header, and randomness tests to attempt to identify TrueCrypt volumes. [ 43 ] Although these features give argue to suspect a file to be a TrueCrypt bulk, there are, however, some programs which exist for the purpose of securely erasing files by employing a method of overwriting file contents, and free phonograph record outer space, with strictly random data ( i.e. “ shred ” & “ scrub ” [ 44 ] ), thereby creating reasonable doubt to counter point accusations declaring a file, made of statistically random data, to be a TrueCrypt file. [ 35 ] [ 45 ] If a system drive, or a partition on it, has been encrypted with TrueCrypt, then alone the data on that partition is deniable. When the TrueCrypt boot stevedore replaces the normal boot loader, an offline analysis of the drive can positively determine that a TrueCrypt boot loader is present and so lead to the coherent inference that a TrueCrypt partition is besides present. even though there are features to obfuscate its determination ( i.e. displaying a BIOS-like message to misdirect an observer such as, “ Non-system disk ” or “ magnetic disk error ” ), these reduce the functionality of the TrueCrypt kick loader and do not hide the content of the TrueCrypt boot loader from offline analysis. [ 46 ] here again, the manipulation of a shroud operate on organization is the propose method acting for retaining deniability. [ 37 ]

performance [edit ]

TrueCrypt supports parallelized [ 47 ] : 63 encoding for multi-core systems and, under Microsoft Windows, pipelined read/write operations ( a form of asynchronous processing ) [ 47 ] : 63 to reduce the operation hit of encoding and decoding. On newer processors supporting the AES-NI direction set, TrueCrypt supports hardware-accelerated AES to further improve performance. [ 47 ] : 64 The operation impact of phonograph record encoding is specially noticeable on operations which would normally use aim memory access ( DMA ), as all data must pass through the CPU for decoding, quite than being copied directly from phonograph record to RAM. In a screen carried out by Tom’s Hardware, although TrueCrypt is slower compared to an unencrypted harrow, the disk overhead of real-time encoding was found to be similar careless of whether mid-range or state-of-the-art hardware is in manipulation, and this shock was “ quite acceptable ”. [ 48 ] In another article the operation monetary value was found to be unnoticeable when working with “ popular background applications in a fair manner ”, but it was noted that “ power users will complain ”. [ 49 ]

incompatibility with FlexNet Publisher and SafeCast [edit ]

Installing third-party software which uses FlexNet Publisher or SafeCast ( which are used for preventing software plagiarism on products by Adobe such as Adobe Photoshop ) can damage the TrueCrypt bootloader on Windows partitions/drives encrypted by TrueCrypt and render the drive unbootable. [ 50 ] This is caused by the inappropriate design of FlexNet Publisher writing to the first drive track and overwriting whatever non-Windows bootloader exists there. [ 51 ]

security concerns [edit ]

TrueCrypt is vulnerable to versatile known attacks which are besides present in other disk encoding software releases such as BitLocker. To prevent those, the documentation distributed with TrueCrypt requires users to follow versatile security precautions. [ 52 ] Some of those attacks are detailed below .

Encryption keys stored in memory [edit ]

TrueCrypt stores its keys in RAM ; on an ordinary personal computer the DRAM will maintain its contents for several seconds after power is cut ( or long if the temperature is lowered ). evening if there is some abasement in the memory contents, diverse algorithms can intelligently recover the key. This method acting, known as a cold boot attack ( which would apply in particular to a notebook computer obtained while in power-on, suspended, or screen-locked mode ), has been successfully used to attack a file system protected by TrueCrypt. [ 53 ]

forcible security [edit ]

TrueCrypt software documentation states that TrueCrypt is ineffective to secure data on a computer if an attacker physically accessed it and TrueCrypt is used on the compromised calculator by the exploiter again ( this does not apply to a common case of a stolen, lost, or confiscated calculator ). [ 54 ] The attacker having physical access to a calculator can, for exercise, install a hardware/software keylogger, a bus-mastering device capturing memory, or install any other malicious hardware or software, allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data ( including encoding keys and passwords ), or to decrypt encrypted data using get passwords or encoding keys. consequently, physical security is a basic precede of a guarantee system. Attacks such as this are frequently called “ malefic maid attacks “. [ 55 ]

Malware [edit ]

TrueCrypt software documentation states that TrueCrypt can not secure data on a calculator if it has any kind of malware installed. Malware may log keystrokes, therefore exposing passwords to an attacker. [ 56 ]

The “ stone ” bootkit [edit ]

The “ pit ” bootkit, an MBR rootkit presented by austrian software developer Peter Kleissner at the Black Hat Technical Security Conference USA 2009, [ 57 ] [ 58 ] has been shown able of tampering TrueCrypt ‘s MBR, efficaciously bypassing TrueCrypt ‘s fully volume encoding. [ 59 ] [ 60 ] [ 61 ] [ 62 ] [ 63 ] Potentially every hard magnetic disk encoding software is affected by this kind of attack if the encoding software does not rely on hardware-based encoding technologies like TPM, or if the assail is made with administrative privileges while the encrypted operate system is running. [ 64 ] [ 65 ] Two types of approach scenarios exist in which it is possible to maliciously take advantage of this bootkit : in the foremost one, the user is required to launch the bootkit with administrative privileges once the personal computer has already booted into Windows ; in the second one, analogously to hardware keyloggers, a malicious person needs physical access to the exploiter ‘s TrueCrypt-encrypted hard harrow : in this context this is needed to modify the user ‘s TrueCrypt MBR with that of the Stoned bootkit and then place the difficult magnetic disk back on the ignorantness exploiter ‘s personal computer, sol that when the user boots the personal computer and types his/her TrueCrypt password on boot, the “ pit ” bootkit intercepts it thereafter because, from that moment on, the Stoned bootkit is loaded before TrueCrypt ‘s MBR in the boot succession. The first type of attack can be prevented as usual by good security practices, e.g. keep off running non-trusted executables with administrative privileges. The second base one can be successfully neutralized by the exploiter if he/she suspects that the code hard phonograph record might have been physically available to person he/she does not trust, by booting the encrypted engage organization with TrueCrypt ‘s Rescue Disk alternatively of booting it directly from the hard magnetic disk. With the rescue magnetic disk, the drug user can restore TrueCrypt ‘s MBR to the hard disk. [ 66 ]

Trusted Platform Module [edit ]

The FAQ section of the TrueCrypt web site states that the Trusted Platform Module ( TPM ) can not be relied upon for security, because if the attacker has physical or administrative entree to the computer and you use it afterwards, the calculator could have been modified by the attacker e.g. a malicious component—such as a hardware keystroke logger—could have been used to capture the password or other sensitive data. Since the TPM does not prevent an attacker from maliciously modifying the computer, TrueCrypt will not support the TPM. [ 65 ]

security audits [edit ]

In 2013 a calibrate scholar at Concordia University published a detailed on-line report, in which he states that he has confirmed the integrity of the distribute Windows binaries of version 7.1a. [ 67 ] A crowdfunding campaign attempting to conduct an independent security audit of TrueCrypt was successfully funded in October 2013. A non-profit organization called the Open Crypto Audit Project ( OCAP ) was formed, calling itself “ a community-driven global first step which grew out of the inaugural comprehensive examination public audit and cryptanalysis of the wide used encoding software TrueCrypt ”. [ 68 ] The organization established contact with TrueCrypt developers, who welcomed the audit. [ 69 ] [ 70 ] Phase I of the audit was successfully completed on 14 April 2014, finding “ no testify of backdoors or malicious code ”. Matthew D. Green, one of the auditors, added “ I think it ‘s thoroughly that we did n’t find anything ace critical. ” [ 71 ] One day after TrueCrypt ‘s end of animation announcement, OCAP confirmed that the audit would continue as planned, with Phase II expected to begin in June 2014 and wrap up by the end of September. [ 72 ] [ 73 ] The Phase II audit was delayed, but was completed 2 April 2015 by NCC Cryptography Services. This audited account “ found no evidence of consider backdoors, or any austere design flaws that will make the software insecure in most instances. ” [ 74 ] [ 76 ] The french National Agency for the Security of Information Systems ( ANSSI ) stated that while TrueCrypt 6.0 and 7.1a have previously attained ANSSI authentication, migration to an interchange license merchandise is recommended as a precautionary measure. [ 77 ] According to Gibson Research Corporation, Steven Barnhart wrote to an e-mail address for a TrueCrypt Foundation member he had used in the past and received respective replies from “ David ”. According to Barnhart, the main points of the electronic mail messages were that the TrueCrypt Foundation was “ happy with the audit, it did n’t spark anything ”, and that the cause for the announcement was that “ there is nobelium longer interest [ in maintaining the visualize ]. ” [ 78 ] According to a study released 29 September 2015, TrueCrypt includes two vulnerabilities in the driver that TrueCrypt installs on Windows systems allowing an attacker arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation via DLL hijacking. [ 79 ] In January 2016, the vulnerability was fixed in VeraCrypt, [ 80 ] but it remains unpatched in TrueCrypt ‘s unmaintained installers .

legal cases [edit ]

operation Satyagraha [edit ]

In July 2008, several TrueCrypt-secured hard drives were seized from brazilian banker Daniel Dantas, who was suspected of fiscal crimes. The brazilian National Institute of Criminology ( INC ) tried unsuccessfully for five months to obtain access to his files on the TrueCrypt-protected disks. They enlisted the help oneself of the FBI, who used dictionary attacks against Dantas ‘ disks for over 12 months, but were placid ineffective to decrypt them. [ 81 ] [ 82 ]

United States v. John Doe [edit ]

In 2012 the United States 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a John Doe TrueCrypt drug user could not be compelled to decrypt several of his hard drives. [ 83 ] [ 84 ] The court ‘s rule noted that FBI forensic examiners were unable to get past TrueCrypt ‘s encoding ( and consequently were ineffective to access the datum ) unless Doe either decrypted the drives or gave the FBI the password, and the court then ruled that Doe ‘s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent legally prevented the Government from making him or her do thus. [ 85 ] [ 86 ]

David Miranda [edit ]

On 18 August 2013 David Miranda, partner of journalist Glenn Greenwald, was detained at London ‘s Heathrow Airport by Metropolitan Police while en route to Rio de Janeiro from Berlin. He was carrying with him an external hard drive said to be containing sensitive documents pertaining to the 2013 ball-shaped surveillance disclosures sparked by Edward Snowden. Contents of the force were encrypted by TrueCrypt, which authorities said “ renders the material highly difficult to access. ” [ 87 ] Detective Superintendent Caroline Goode stated the difficult drive contained around 60 gigabytes of data, “ of which merely 20 have been accessed to date. ” She further stated the process to decode the material was building complex and “ therefore far only 75 documents have been reconstructed since the property was initially received. ” [ 87 ] Guardian subscriber Naomi Colvin concluded the statements were misleading, stating that it was possible Goode was not even referring to any actual encrypted material, but preferably deleted files reconstructed from unencrypted, unallocated space on the hard drive, or flush plaintext documents from Miranda ‘s personal effects. [ 88 ] Glenn Greenwald supported this assessment in an interview with Democracy Now!, mentioning that the UK government filed an affidavit asking the court to allow them to retain possession of Miranda ‘s belongings. The grounds for the request were that they could not break the encoding, and were only able to access 75 of the documents that he was carrying, which Greenwald said “ most of which were credibly ones related to his school work and personal manipulation. ” [ 89 ]

James DeSilva [edit ]

In February 2014, an Arizona Department of Real Estate IT department employee, James DeSilva, was arrested on charges of intimate exploitation of a minor through the share of denotative images over the Internet. His calculator, encrypted with TrueCrypt, was seized, and DeSilva refused to reveal the password. Forensics detectives from the Maricopa County Sheriff ‘s Office were unable to gain access to his store files. [ 90 ]

Lauri Love [edit ]

In October 2013, British–Finnish activist Lauri Love was arrested by the National Crime Agency ( NCA ) on charges of hacking into a US department or means computer and one consider of conspiring to do the same. [ 91 ] [ 92 ] [ 93 ] The politics confiscated all of his electronics and demanded he provide them with the necessary keys to decrypt the devices. Love refused. On 10 May 2016 a District Judge ( Magistrate ‘s Court ) rejected a request by the NCA that Love be forced to turn over his encoding keys or passwords to TrueCrypt files on an SD wag and hard drives that were among the impound property. [ 94 ]

Druking [edit ]

In the particular prosecutor investigation for Druking in South Korea, the particular prosecutor decrypted some of the files encrypted by TrueCrypt by guessing the passphrase. [ 95 ] [ 96 ] The special prosecutor said the hide volumes were specially unmanageable to deal with. He decrypted some of encrypted files by trying words and phrases the druking group had used elsewhere as parts of the passphrase in order to make train guesses. [ 97 ] [ 98 ] [ 99 ] [ 100 ]

license and generator model [edit ]

TrueCrypt was released as source-available, under the “ TrueCrypt License, ” which is unique to the TrueCrypt software. [ 101 ] [ 102 ] As of version 7.1a ( the concluding full version of the software, released Feb 2012 ), the TrueCrypt License was version 3.0. It is not part of the panoply of wide used open source licenses. The Free Software Foundation ( FSF ) states that it is not a spare software license. [ 103 ] discussion of the license terms on the Open Source Initiative ( OSI ) ‘s license-discuss mailing list in October 2013 suggests that the TrueCrypt License has made progress towards conformity with the Open Source Definition but would not yet pass if proposed for documentation as Open Source software. [ 104 ] [ 105 ] According to stream OSI president Simon Phipps :

… it is not at all appropriate for [ TrueCrypt ] to describe itself as “ open source. ” This function of the term “ open informant ” to describe something under a license that ‘s not lone unapproved by OSI but known to be subject to issues is unacceptable. … As OSI director and open source expert Karl Fogel said, “ The ideal solution is not to have them remove the words ‘open generator ‘ from their self-description, but preferably for their software to be under an OSI-approved open informant license. ” [ 104 ]

As a consequence of its questionable status with esteem to copyright restrictions and early potential legal issues, [ 106 ] major Linux distributions do not consider the TrueCrypt License free : TrueCrypt is not included with Debian, [ 107 ] Ubuntu, [ 108 ] Fedora, [ 109 ] or openSUSE. [ 110 ]

end of life and license version 3.1 [edit ]

28 May 2014 announcement of discontinuance of TrueCrypt besides came with a new version 7.2 of the software. Among the many changes to the informant code from the previous turn were changes to the TrueCrypt License — including removal of specific terminology that required attribution of TrueCrypt vitamin a well as a yoke to the official web site to be included on any derivative products — forming a license interpretation 3.1. [ 111 ] Cryptographer Matthew Green, who had help raise funds for TrueCrypt ‘s audit noted a connection between TrueCrypt ‘s refusal to change the license and their departure-time warning. “ They set the wholly thing on ardor, and now possibly cipher is going to trust it because they ‘ll think there ‘s some boastful evil vulnerability in the code. ” [ 112 ] On 16 June 2014, the merely alleged TrueCrypt developer still answering electronic mail replied to a message by Matthew Green asking for license to use the TrueCrypt trademark for a fork released under a standard open source license. permission was denied, which led to the two known forks being named VeraCrypt and CipherShed angstrom good as a re-implementation named tc-play preferably than TrueCrypt. [ 113 ] [ 114 ]

Trademarks [edit ]

In 2007 a US brand for TrueCrypt was registered under the name of Ondrej Tesarik with a company name TrueCrypt Developers Association [ 115 ] and a brand on the “ key ” logo was registered under the name of David Tesarik with a ship’s company mention TrueCrypt Developers Association. [ 116 ] In 2009 the company name TrueCrypt Foundation was registered in the US by a person named David Tesarik. [ 117 ] The TrueCrypt Foundation non-profit organization last filed tax returns in 2010, [ 118 ] and the company was dissolved in 2014. [ citation needed ]

See besides [edit ]

References [edit ]

Archives [edit ]

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